The political problem
Every CBDC proposal to date resolves to one of two positions: Surveillance CBDC: The central bank can observe every transaction in real-time. This is structurally equivalent to abolishing cash. It has encountered serious political opposition in the US, EU, and India, and has been explicitly banned from the Federal Reserve by riders attached to multiple appropriations bills. No CBDC: The political path of least resistance. Cash declines; no private alternative emerges. Financial surveillance by private intermediaries (banks, card networks) continues unchecked. shyware offers a third position that resolves the political deadlock:Private from counterparties — identical to cash. Auditable by the state with legal process — identical to a bank account.This is not a technical compromise. It is the correct description of how cash already works, implemented on a canonical BFT-style ledger with a transparent supply invariant.
Why not the Federal Reserve
The Fed cannot deploy this. Congressional opposition to CBDC is categorical — “no Federal Reserve digital currency” riders have appeared in multiple bills regardless of the privacy properties of the proposed design. The viable path runs through private issuers acting under existing licensing:- A stablecoin issuer with MSB licensing deploys shyware. Users hold private dollar balances.
- The product accumulates adoption. The privacy property becomes a competitive baseline.
- A sovereign (Singapore, UAE, or a nation seeking cash-equivalent digital currency without surrendering AML) licenses the protocol for a national deployment.
Sovereign deployment architecture
AML compliance model
The sovereign deployment is structurally identical to cash:| Property | Cash | shyware |
|---|---|---|
| Counterparty privacy | Merchant cannot surveil balance | Two-list invariant |
| Supply auditability | Central bank knows total in circulation | GET /supply — public, BFT-enforced |
| Tax authority access | Warrant required for financial records | Admin API + legal process |
| Proactive surveillance | Not possible | Not possible by design |
| Double-spend prevention | Serial numbers + wear | Nullifier uniqueness enforced by consensus |
TotalSupply == TotalMinted - TotalBurned) is enforced by canonical
consensus with the shared managed signing boundary — the issuer cannot inflate supply without
the validators detecting it.
This is a stronger supply guarantee than physical cash.
Identity model options
| Option | Identity binding | When to use |
|---|---|---|
| Wallet ECDSA (default) | H(wallet_address) | Permissioned wallets issued by the sovereign |
| Didit biometric | H(person_secret) attested by Didit | When Sybil resistance matters (e.g. UBI distribution) |
| National ID | H(national_id_hash) | Full sovereign control; operator runs identity oracle |
account_commitment field in
RegisterAccountData accepts any hash — the protocol does not prescribe what it commits to.